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Abstract 
This research paper discusses the role of institutions in the rapid growth and successful 
international integration of Switzerland during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. In analysing the emergence and consolidation of the institutions whose 
existence was crucial, the paper looks both at the political institutions that managed 
conflicts and promoted cooperation between private and public actors and the economic 
institutions that, on the one hand, compensated the groups that fell behind in the 
developmental process (e.g., agricultural subsidies, high tolerance for domestic cartels, 
tariffs for some industries, institutions for labour representation) and, on the other hand, 
enhanced productivity. In addition, the absence of some institutions such as a patent law 
and an independent central bank was also crucial in the Swiss case, even though these 
two institutions are regarded as pre-requisites of development by today’s economic 
orthodoxy. The paper concludes by drawing lessons for today’s developing countries. 
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Despite the absence of natural resources and no sea access, between 1870 and 1940 
Switzerland became one of the wealthiest countries in the world. For most scholars, this 
‘Swiss success story’ resulted from a combination of a privileged position at the heart of 
Europe, a neutrality status that preserved the country from the world wars, and 
successful integration in the international economy, combined with liberal economic 
policies. Even if it has largely been classified as a stereotypical example of a ‘liberal 
success’, the high performance of the Swiss economy did not solely rely on these 
precepts. On the contrary, notwithstanding its overall liberal trade policy, the Swiss 
economy also developed core institutions that largely departed from neo-classical 
recipes. 
In this paper, we focus on the impact of institutions in the economic growth of 
Switzerland. Few scholars have taken into account the role of political and economic 
institutions in analyzing the Swiss growth experience; they have only integrated this 
dimension when dealing with the impact of political institutions, in particular the 
political freedom and stability of the Swiss democracy, on economic development. 
We can distinguish two categories of political institutions that were important in the 
economic development of Switzerland: first, the ‘institutions of conflict management’ 
among economic and political elites that promoted consensual problem solving among 
them; second, partly linked to these institutions, close public–private partnerships also 
played a crucial role in the promotion of growth enhancing economic institutions. These 
political institutions contributed decisively to the adoption of two types of economic 
institutions. First, what we called ‘institutions of domestic compensation’ – that 
compensated the social groups that fell behind in the developmental process (e.g., 
agricultural subsidies, high tolerance for domestic cartels, tariffs for some industries, 
institutions for labour disputes resolution). 
Second, the political institutions also determined the adoption of growth enhancing 
institutions, such as patent law and central banking, which, according to the IMF or the 
World Bank, favor growth by establishing an incentive structure that reduces 
uncertainty and promotes efficiency. However, the Swiss historical experience 
demonstrates that these ‘good institutions’, which are generally considered as important 
for economic growth, did not play a central role in the first phase of the ‘Swiss success 
story’ (see Chang 2002 for other historical experiences). Until 1907, these two types of 
institutions did not (or barely) exist in Switzerland; and despite their absence, the Swiss 
economy nonetheless witnessed a very fast growth during the preceding decades. 
Our chapter has four parts. In the first section, we present a model of the links between 
institutions and economic growth in small European countries. In subsequent sections, 
we examine the Swiss case. In the second part, we briefly present the ‘Swiss success 
story’, the fast economic growth of this country between 1870 and 1950. In the third 
part, we explore the importance of political institutions in Switzerland during this 
period. Finally, we analyze the impact of economic institutions on Swiss growth. 
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1 Institutions and economic growth in small European countries 
Growth-stimulating political and economic institutions were not specific to Switzerland. 
Other small European countries shared similar institutional characteristics. Menzel 
(1988) published an important book on the successful industrialization of four small 
countries (Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden and Canada). The industrialization process 
was first and foremost based on the following factors: a mix of technology transfer and 
endogenous invention; trade policies that coupled greater world economic integration 
through free trade with selective protectionist measures for some domestic sectors; a 
niche strategy based first on low wages, then on a very flexible marketing strategy 
oriented towards the quality of export goods; a policy of liberalization of trade and 
policy associated with growing state intervention (see also Menzel 1992). 
As a second step, these countries were able to link the export sectors with the whole 
economy and to avoid a too strong concentration of wealth. This transition was made 
possible by economic, social and political preconditions. Economic preconditions 
included among others a relatively equal distribution of income in the export sectors and 
an intervening state (selective protectionist measures, nationalization of natural resources) 
in order to diminish foreign competition but also to support import substitution. An equal 
distribution in landownership, an homogenous social structure, a generally high level of 
education were essential social preconditions for the spread and maintenance of flexibility 
and readiness to innovate. Finally, Menzel (1992: 80) emphasized the political 
preconditions, in particular democratic institutions ‘in which forces favoring development 
can articulate themselves and patterns have to be established which make conflict 
resolution in an institutionalised manner possible’. These political institutions gave way to 
a far reaching participation of the whole population (bourgeoisie, middle class, farmers, 
workers) to wealth distribution and allowed them to gain sufficient political influence to 
limit the resistance of the old elites. 
Following Menzel (1988) and Katzenstein (1985), who both insist on the importance of 
political institutions in the economic development of small European countries, we argue 
that small countries present a particular framework for the interaction of institutions and 
economic growth (see Figure 1). First, the small size of their domestic markets provide an 
explanation for the early economic openness of these countries. On the eve of the First 
World War, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland were the developed countries with 
the highest export per capita and with very high stock of foreign direct investment per 
capita (David 2003). However, none of these countries simply developed by opening 
itself up to foreign trade and investment. On the contrary, export dependence and the 
general liberal orientation of their trade policy was ‘embedded’ in domestic institutions 
that were far from liberal, but favourable for economic growth. 
In addition to a similar structural position in relation to international markets, small 
European countries also shared common political institutions; particularly ones that 
dealt with conflict management and public-private cooperation (see Figure 1). The 
vulnerability of these countries to changes in the international environment favored the 
establishment of peaceful conflict-resolution institutions that would invite the 
participation of the major political and economic representatives of the various strata of 
society. Consensual political systems (based on a proportional electoral system and 
coalitions governments) and democratic corporatist institutions (where the major 
employers associations, trade unions and public officials negotiate economic and social 
policies) were particularly frequent in small European countries (Katzenstein 1985). In 
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addition, these institutions of conflict management were often completed or enlarged 
through the consolidation of public-private cooperative institutions designed to promote 
efficient social and economic policies, where the interest of the national economy 
overrode the interests of one special social category or interests groups. 
These political institutions were, in turn, decisive in the adoption of some specific 
economic institutions in small countries.1 Indeed, various elements of domestic 
compensation and ‘selective protectionism’ complemented the globally liberal 
orientation of their trade policies. In the words of Menzel (1988), their strategy towards 
international markets was ‘associative-dissociative’: associative because of their 
dependence on international markets for exports and imports, and dissociative because 
these countries also introduced different measures to reduce the pressures of world 
markets on specific economic sectors or actors, such measures as import-substitution 
policies, state intervention or other forms of protectionism and public subsidies for 
some economic sectors (agriculture or industries producing for the domestic market, see 
Katzenstein 1985, Schröter 1999). 
This argument has often been advanced to explain the ‘dualist structure’ of small 
European economies, having on the one hand, export-oriented sectors that were very 
competitive on international markets and, on the other hand, sectors producing mainly 
for the domestic market and largely sheltered from international competitive pressures. 
However, these forms of ‘selective protectionism’ also existed in export-oriented 
sectors and their larger companies through the establishment of specific regulations 
concerning company law and financial markets. These regulations, such as complex 
voting rights structures or ‘pyramidal’ forms of control, allowed small European 
economies to maintain control over their large companies and to avoid the risk of 
foreign takeovers (see David and Mach 2004). 
Besides these institutions of domestic compensation, the political institutions also 
favoured the adoption of economic institutions that enhanced productivity and favored 
growth, such as strong protection of property rights, vocational training system, and the 
presence of stable (financial) markets, which influenced the structure of economic 
incentives in society. 
These political and economic institutions were beneficial to economic growth in several 
ways. First, the political institutions favored the establishment of peaceful conflict-
resolutions mechanisms, in other words, of a consensual political order (on this issue, 
see North et al. 2000). By protecting the ‘losers’ from international recessions or shocks 
(farmers, workers, etc.) through domestic compensation, they contributed to political 
stability, thereby creating an investment- and growth-friendly environment. Second, 
these distributive policies also promoted a rather egalitarian wealth distribution, which 
stimulated the economic development of these countries (Alesina and Rodrik 1994). 
Third, by preventing social fragmentation, these institutions created structures and 
opportunities for cooperative problem-solving and increased society’s potential for 
productive investment, innovation and human resource development (Bardhan 2000). 
Finally, they influenced the structure of economic incentives in society and provided a 
structure for everyday transactions that reduced uncertainty and allowed groups and 
individuals to enlarge the set of possible fruitful exchanges (North 1991). 
                                                 
1 For a distinction between economic and political institutions, see Acemoglu et al. (2004). 
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Figure 1 Institutions and economic growth in small European countries: a simple model 
 
In small countries, the national elites learned to adjust to the pressures of their 
international environment on which they had no influence. This fact is an important 
reason why national institutions were rather flexible. Katzenstein (1985) thus 
emphasized the capacity of small European countries for ‘flexible adjustment’ to the 
fluctuations of international markets. This institutional flexibility is important because 
‘the most important elements of institutional structures are those that ensure an ability to 
adapt to different conditions and to adjust to new circumstances as some necessary, 
rather than those that entail the retention and maintenance of any set of policies. The 
capacity for adaptation, based in part on the population’s education and their political 
liberties, may ultimately be more significant for economic growth than the continuation 
of any particular set of beliefs, rules, or behavior.’ (Engerman and Sokoloff 2003: 13). 
2 The Swiss success story (1870-1950): general characteristics 
Before turning our attention to the emergence, functioning and consequences of 
institutions, we will first present some general facts and evidence on the growth path 
followed by the Swiss economy between 1870 and 1950. 
During this period, Switzerland exhibited the highest growth rate of all European 
countries. Table 2 reports estimates of growth rates and income levels of real GDP per 
capita for Western Europe in the period 1870-1950. It shows that in terms of income per 
head Switzerland progressively overtook all the other European countries between 1870 
and 1950. 
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Table 2 Rates of growth and levels of real GDP per capita, 1870-1950 
 Rates of growth (% per year) Levels of GDP (UK=100) 
 1870-1913 1913-50 1870-1950 1870 1913 1950 
Belgium 1.1 0.7 0,9 84.4 85.8 78.7 
Denmark 1.6 1.6 1.6 62.8 79.5 100.1 
Finland 1.4 1.9 1.7 35.7 42.9 61.3 
France 1.5 1.1 1.3 58.8 70.8 76.0 
Germany 1.6 0.2 0.9 57.6 74.1 55.9 
Italy 1.3 0.8 1.1 47.0 52.1 50.5 
Netherlands 0.9 1.1 1.0 86.4 82.3 86.4 
Norway 1.3 2.1 1.7 44.9 50.8 78.7 
Sweden 1.5 2.1 1.8 52.1 62.9 97.1 
Switzerland 1.7 2.1 1.8 65.9 86.7 130.6 
United Kingdom 1.0 0.9 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Maddison (2003). 
 
During the first period (1870-1913), Switzerland went through the fastest growth of the 
developed countries (Table 2). This growth is even more striking when the Swiss 
performance is compared to the United Kingdom and Belgium, two other countries that 
became industrialized at an early stage. In fact, Switzerland had a rate of growth 
comparable to the late industrializers (Germany or Sweden). It had a strong position in 
the sectors of the First Industrial Revolution (textile, watch making), but also in the 
sectors, which emerged at the end of the nineteenth century (chemical, machine and 
electrical industries) (Siegenthaler 1985). 
For the period 1870-1913, Swiss economic growth benefited from two other factors. 
The first is linked to the use of electricity. Switzerland was a pioneer in the development 
of the hydro-electrical industry and became the second largest producer of electricity 
per capita after Norway in 1914. The replacement of other forms of energy with 
electricity led companies to increase the number of motors and thus their motive power 
(Paquier 1998). 
Second, during the three decades preceding the First World War, the financial sector 
played an important role in Swiss industrial growth. By providing more or less long-
term operating credits, by facilitating investment operations on capital markets and by 
creating financial companies, banks backed the activities and the growth of certain 
industrial branches, in particular the electrical industry. Big banks also profited from the 
industrial development during this period (Mazbouri 2005). 
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Profound structural changes in the industrial sector marked the second period (1914-50). 
The textile industry, which until 1870 had played a leading role in the industrialization 
process of Switzerland and which had been able to maintain its dominant position until 
about 1918, started to decline rapidly. At the same time the growth of the metal and 
machine industry, which had begun during the previous period, continued, turning it 
into the leading industry during the first half of the twentieth century. The success of 
this sector can be explained partly by its capacity to integrate foreign technologies and 
to adapt them to the Swiss particularities (predominance of hydraulic resources, see 
Paquier 1998). Furthermore, Swiss companies were able to benefit from the backing of 
financial companies created between 1890 and 1913 by German and Swiss banks in 
order to respond to the long-term investment needs generated by the enormous 
infrastructure expenditure (mainly electrification of lighting and transport, see Hertner 
1987). Lastly, the public authorities played a non-negligible role in this growth. Indeed, 
from the 1890s onwards, the municipal and cantonal authorities controlled the 
production and distribution of gas and electricity. These authorities would 
systematically give preference to Swiss companies. 
From 1910 to 1950, the service sector represented also an important pillar for the Swiss 
growth, contributing to almost 60 per cent of the growth of Swiss GDP (David and 
Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer 2002: table 9). This element is closely linked to Switzerland’s 
growing eminence as a financial center in the international arena. The First World War 
and the 1920s marked Swiss finance’s emergence as a leading actor on the world stage. 
A comparison illustrates this evolution: whereas before the First World War, the assets 
of the seven major Swiss banks accounted for only 26 per cent of those of German 
banks, the proportion doubled in 1928; the cumulated assets of the eight major Swiss 
banks amounted to 52 per cent of that of the five largest German banks. 
The Swiss banking center had three major trump cards. First of all, the Swiss franc’s 
stability played a crucial role at a time characterized by the marked instability of the 
international financial order. Second, Swiss banks benefited from political stability and 
neutrality; circumstances that favoured the inflow of foreign capital. Lastly, capital was 
attracted by rather non-constraining circumstances, such as a tax system in favour of the 
holders of capital and bank secrecy, which was codified into a banking law in 1934 
(Perrenoud et al. 2002; Guex 2002). 
Switzerland clearly benefited from its neutrality during the two world wars. Research 
concerning the ‘Swiss success story’ has also stressed the significance of external 
markets; some have insisted on the leading role of export industries, others (less 
numerous) on the importance of the sectors linked to the domestic markets (agriculture, 
handicrafts; see David 2003). However, very few scholars have taken into consideration 
the role of institutions in supporting growth. The next part will try to fill this gap. 
3 Emergence and consolidation of political institutions (1870-1950) 
Some economists have already underlined the central importance of political stability in 
the economic success of the Swiss economy (Knöpfel 1988; Brunetti 1992). These 
studies have especially highlighted the decisive role of the referendum in promoting 
political and social stability in this country, which in turn created an environment 
favourable to investment and growth. These studies have, however, only broached the 
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subject superficially without exploring in any thorough or detailed manner the link 
between political institutions and economic growth. We will first present the general 
historical context of the second half of the nineteenth century, which was a decisive 
period in terms of institutional innovation and political integration, and then analyze the 
creation and consolidation of these political institutions. 
The second half of the nineteenth century was a crucial period in the establishment of 
stable political institutions that later played a central role in the growth path followed by 
the Swiss economy. The creation of the Swiss Confederation in 1848 by the Protestant 
radical-democratic movement against the opposition of the Catholic cantons was 
combined with the maintenance of a federalist structure with large power in the hands of 
the cantons. The strong federalist structure of the new Confederation was a concession 
for the Catholic cantons that had lost the Sonderbund war against the Protestant cantons 
in 1847. The maintenance of an important power structure at the cantonal level largely 
allowed the peaceful cohabitation of the Protestant elites, organized in the radical 
democratic movement, and the Catholics organized in the Christian-Democratic Party. 
After two decades of rapid growth until the mid-1870s, the long depression also hit 
Switzerland during the last third of the century. It was during this period that some 
decisive political institutions were established. Following the early democratization of 
the country in 1848, the total reform of the Constitution in 1874 enlarged the scope of 
Swiss democracy with the introduction of the most important direct democratic 
instrument: the facultative referendum, which allowed voters to challenge any act 
passed by Parliament if they succeed to gather 50,000 signatures. According to several 
authors, the referendum was the key institution behind the development of a consensus-
based political system (see Neidhart 1970; Knöpfel 1988; Brunetti 1992). The 
government, dominated by the Radical-Democratic Party, learned to share its power 
with the opposition in order to prevent its bills from being challenged through the 
referendum. The government introduced an inclusive policy-making strategy by 
allowing the relevant actors, especially the major economic peak associations, to co-
draft legislation in what was now called the pre-parliamentary phase. 
While the Radical Democratic Party (founder of the Confederation) was by far the 
dominant political force, it progressively integrated all the major economic and political 
actors in order to reduce the potential threat of the referendum: the major peak 
economic associations at the end of the nineteenth century (the trade unions only later 
during the 1920s and 1930s) and the other major political parties from the last decade of 
the nineteenth up to the 1950s.2 
In his analysis of the impact of Swiss political institutions on economic growth, Brunetti 
(1992: 108ff.) advanced the following causal argument: by favouring the integration of 
all major political actors in the decision-making process, the referendum facilitated 
political power sharing and prevented brutal political changes. Power sharing induced 
by the referendum at the federal level (in addition to the federalist structure of the state) 
reinforced the strong pro-status-quo bias and the low capacity for rapid change of the 
Swiss political system. This slowness had however an important advantage: it 
                                                 
2  In 1891, the Christian-Democratic Party joined the government, the Swiss people’s Party in 1929 and 
finally the Social-Democratic Party in 1943. This led to the formation of the so-called ‘magic formula’ 
of the Swiss government coalition in 1959, composed of the four most important parties. 
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reinforced the predictability and legal security of the country, promoting an 
environment favourable to investment and thus growth during the first half of the 
twentieth century. 
Besides this general impact of the referendum (political stability, predictability and 
reduction of uncertainty), other institutions, related to the existence of the referendum, 
had a strong positive impact on economic growth. We can distinguish two sets of 
political institutions that were decisive in the strong growth of the Swiss economy. First, 
institutions of conflict resolution were very important in supporting social and political 
stability of the Swiss economy. Second, the weakness of the central state and the early 
organization of encompassing peak level economic associations promoted the 
institutionalization of efficient public–private partnerships providing different types of 
public goods at the federal and cantonal levels. 
3.1 Conflict resolution institutions and social peace 
The early political integration of all the major economic and political forces in the 
decision-making process helps to understand the political and social stability that 
largely prevailed during the first half of the twentieth century. First, the ‘pre-
parliamentary institutions’ of inclusive policy-making provided strong incentives for 
peaceful conflict resolution at the political level. In order to prevent the risk of a 
rejection in a popular referendum, the dominant political actors could not ignore the 
position of any important economic or political actor. These institutions were decisive 
for cooperation among the economic and political elites of all the major social groups 
(business interests, farmers representatives and trade unions),3 and it led to the adoption 
of public policies and regulations aimed at satisfying all the major actors involved in 
policy decision-making. 
Second, at the turn of the century, we could see the progressive formation of a 
‘bourgeois bloc’, comprising all the major economic associations4 and the two major 
political parties (the Radical Democratic and Christian Democratic parties), which 
learned to cooperate in order to counteract the pressures from the rising labor movement 
(Humair 2004). The institutions of pre-parliamentary negotiations were largely limited 
to the major peak economic associations, while the trade unions and the political left 
remained largely excluded from this new political configuration emerging at the end of 
the nineteenth century. However, the early democratization of the Swiss political system 
and the subsidization of the Swiss federation of trade unions (USS), beginning at the 
time of its creation in 1880, helped to weaken the polarization at the political and 
economic level. Moreover, the gravity of social conflicts was reduced by the absence of 
large urban and industrial concentrations or large landownership (Jost 2001). Even 
though numerous labour disputes took place during the beginning of the twentieth 
century, reaching a peak with the general strike of 1918, the political left and the trade 
                                                 
3  While Katzenstein (1985) mainly focuses his analysis on the 1930s because of the creation of 
democratic corporatist institutions in small European countries, the cooperation between economic 
and political actors was already institutionalized in Switzerland during the end of the nineteenth 
century. 
4  The Swiss Federation of Commerce and Industry, the Swiss Association of Small Business (USAM), 
representing the interests of artisans and crafts, and the Swiss Farmers’ Union (USP). 
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unions were progressively integrated in the political decision-making process during the 
1920s and 1930s. 
The importance of consensus in Switzerland should not obscure two important facts 
(Jost 2001). First, this country went through important conflicts. The creation of the 
Swiss Confederation was the result of a civil war. In a comparative perspective, labour 
disputes and strikes were in Switzerland as numerous as in other European countries 
during the decades preceding the First World War. The formation of a ‘bourgeois bloc’ 
at the end of the nineteenth century was dictated as much by the political institutions of 
conflict resolution as by the will to fight the rise of the labour movement. 
Second, this consensus was often dominated by right-wing political parties and by peak 
business associations. Katzenstein (1985) defined Switzerland as a liberal variant of 
democratic corporatism (as opposed to the social variant), characterized by a strong and 
centralized business community and a relatively decentralized and weak labour 
movement (see also Mach 2005).5 
3.2 Public–private partnership institutions: weak central state and powerful 
encompassing associations 
Partly linked to the institutions designed to facilitate conflict resolution, the public–
private partnership institutions were not directed toward conflict management but 
toward the coordination of public and private actors in the resolution of social and 
economic problems (Hotz 1979). Even though pre-parliamentary institutions, composed 
of representatives of economic associations and civil servants, already represented 
public-private institutions, their function was very different. Whereas the former were 
mainly designed to produce widely supported political decisions, the function of public-
private partnership institutions was mainly to produce collective goods, designed to 
provide services for the whole society. 
It is important to stress the central role of the major peak economic associations in 
Switzerland, not only in the political decision-making process (as shown above), but 
also in the proper functioning of the economy. All the peak economic associations were 
created very early, and they were all subsidized by the federal government from 1870 
onwards in an effort at achieving public duties, such as statistics gathering, vocational 
training, technical norms, or the self-discipline of the sector (Lehmbruch 1991; Mach 
2005). It was easier for the government to financially support these encompassing 
associations instead of hiring new civil servants or of enlarging the bureaucracy of the 
central state. But, it is necessary to underline the fact that the government imposed the 
establishment of one peak association per major social group (workers, industry, 
farmers and artisan sector), which had to be representative of its members. This 
favoured the creation of encompassing associations (by contrast to specialized interests, 
see Olson 1982), which were responsible for a large proportion of the whole population 
and the economy. For example, they were very often obliged to self-discipline 
                                                 
5  Moreover, this consensus did not include certain social groups. Women had to wait until 1971 to get 
universal suffrage at the federal level, and foreigners, who have represented close to 10-20 per cent of 
the Swiss population throughout the course of the twentieth century, have also had very restricted 
political and economic rights. 
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themselves and create self-regulating rules that applied to all their members.6 In 
addition, the importance of private regulation left ample room for manoeuvre and 
allowed for the flexible adoption of economic and social rules. 
The representatives of all these encompassing peak associations were absolutely 
decisive in the development and implementation of all important social and economic 
policies. This meant that economic associations and the state administration established 
very close ties and worked together on all economic and social issues. This facilitated 
the buildup of the trust between political and economic actors and the diffusion of 
information among them. 
4 Economic institutions: domestic compensation and growth supporting 
institutions 
The creation and consolidation of the above-mentioned political institutions were the 
result of both international factors, related to the ‘perceived vulnerability’ toward their 
international environment (dependence on foreign markets; political and military threat 
of powerful surrounding states) by economic and political elites, and domestic 
institutions, such as the referendum and the fragmentation of society. As a consequence, 
they promoted policies that encouraged social cohesion and stability, but also economic 
institutions that were particularly favourable to economic growth. We can distinguish 
between two distinct sets of economic institutions. First, the institutions of domestic 
compensation provided the ‘losers’ of economic openness with protection, which 
strengthened political stability. Second, economic institutions fostered exchange by 
lowering transaction costs and structured economic incentives. 
4.1 Institutions of domestic compensation 
The political institutions favoured the adoption of ‘domestic compensation’ policies that 
were very important during the long economic depression of the late nineteenth century. 
These ‘domestic compensations’ were adopted in order to protect some sectors 
(workers, farmers and industrialists) from global competition and to stabilize the 
domestic economy: agricultural subsidies and protectionist barriers against imports, 
creation of public cantonal banks, the regional consolidation of the railways network, 
and the formation of the first cartels. Without going into a detailed analysis of each 
economic institution, we can provide some general comments on these economic 
institutions. 
Trade barriers and agricultural subsidies were introduced in response to the economic 
depression of the late nineteenth century during the course of the numerous negotiations 
on bilateral trade agreements between Switzerland and its major commercial partners. 
From a very liberal stance, Switzerland moved to a much more protectionist country, 
                                                 
6  Lehner (1983) tried to explain why the Swiss case didn’t fit Olson’s theory on the rise and decline of 
nations. His argument was different from the one developed here. His major argument was to stress 
the role of the openness of the Swiss decision-making process, which reduces the power of specialized 
interests groups and prevents the adoption of rent-seeking institutions (for a critic see Mach 2005). 
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especially with regards to its agriculture, but also some industrial sectors (Humair 
2004). 
The early organization of economic interests went hand in hand with the formation of 
the first cartels, which were created during the world depression of the last decades of 
the nineteenth century. During the beginning of the twentieth century, cartels were even 
more tolerated and consolidated because of some decisions of the Swiss Federal Court. 
The timing for the creation of cartels was particularly important during economic crises 
and wars. 
These measures of domestic compensation were the result of the inclusion of different 
social groups in the decision-making processes, both at the federal and the cantonal 
level. They transformed the Swiss political economy in a fundamental way. Although 
still open to goods and international capital, it ceased to be liberal in a strict sense. It 
reinforced the dualist structure of the Swiss economy which now featured on the one 
hand sheltered domestic sectors (agriculture, construction and more generally sectors 
linked to local markets) and on the other hand competitive sectors oriented toward 
international markets (textiles, mechanical engineering, watches, chemicals, banks and 
insurance companies). 
Selective protectionist measures were reinforced during the first half of the twentieth 
century, particularly during the world wars and during the economic crisis of the 1930s. 
For example, the reform of company law allowed Swiss companies to issue different 
categories of share in order to protect them against the threat of foreign takeovers. Thus, 
selective protectionism not only concerned the domestic sectors of the economy, but 
also the sectors active on international markets. After the Second World War, the 
adoption of the new economic articles of the Constitution included the recognition of 
the legal character of cartels. 
In addition to these policies of ‘selective protectionism’, we can also point to the first 
labour law (Fabrikengesetz) adopted as early as 1877 to protect workers, because of the 
pressure from the left wing of the Radical Democratic Party. This law was among the 
most advanced labour legislation of the time despite the relative weakness of the trade 
unions. The mechanisms of conflict resolution at the political level presented above also 
spread to the economic sphere, especially to industrial relations between trade unions 
and employers associations. In 1937, the very important ‘labour peace’ agreements in 
the two major industrial branches (machine and watch-making industry) were 
concluded. They contributed decisively to the pacification of industrial relations and to 
the consolidation of social partnership institutions. 
4.2 Growth supporting economic institutions 
We now focus our analysis on economic institutions that, according to the IMF and the 
World Bank, support growth. We selected two case-studies: patent law and central 
banking. These institutions resulted from conflict management among elites and 
intensive public-private cooperation, and are therefore particularly illustrative. 
The creation of a central bank illustrates the influence of the main Swiss political 
institutions. In 1897, a referendum was launched against the proposition of a national 
bank adopted by the parliament after several years of deliberation. This project was 
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contested by a coalition of conservative federalists, and by the main peak economic 
association, who was opposed to a state central bank and militated for a mixed or 
private institution. This project was finally rejected in a popular vote in 1897. In 
reaction, the government created a pre-parliamentary commission in which numerous 
opponents were represented. This commission was finally able to reach a compromise 
so that in 1907, the Swiss National Bank finally opened its doors. It was, as required by 
the Swiss Federation of Commerce and Industry, a mixed institution, a joint-stock 
company with public and private shareholders, the majority of the shares being held by 
the cantons. The creation of a central bank illustrated the importance of conflict 
resolutions institutions (referendum, pre-parliamentary commissions) and the close 
interaction of the state and private interests (see Zimmermann 1987). 
The foundation of this financial establishment, as well as other fundamental reforms at 
the institutional and organizational levels, such as the progressive cartelization of the 
Swiss banking sector and the creation of the Swiss Banker’s Association in 1912 gave a 
new impulse to the emergence of the Swiss financial centre. 
The introduction of a patent law was also made possible by cooperation among the 
economic elites and by the close interaction of the state and private interests. In 1882, 
the Swiss population rejected a constitutional reform, which would have allowed the 
government to legislate in the field of property rights. Six years later, after a new vote, 
the first patent law was enacted. It was ‘the most incomplete and selective patent law 
ever enacted in modern times’ (Schiff 1971: 93). It excluded from patentability all 
inventions in the chemical field, but also inventions of new procedures in any industry 
whatsoever. The limits of this law can be explained by the fact that it was the result of a 
compromise between industrial elites.  
For some sectors, in particular the watch making industry, a patent law was considered a 
necessity to protect intellectual property rights and to encourage investments in new 
technology (Veyrassat 2001). Other industrial sectors were fiercely opposed to a patent 
law. The chemical industry played a leading role in this opposition (Tanner 1996). In 
the 1870s, the young Swiss chemical industry was in a difficult position, unable to 
compete with German firms with a big scale advantage. The Basle companies were 
confronted with two alternatives: either give up in the face of German competition or 
adopt a new strategy (Straumann 1997). The Swiss chemical industry followed the latter 
path. This new strategy, which explains the impressive growth of the Swiss chemical 
industry until the First World War, was based on two pillars: innovation and 
imitation/variation (Tanner 1996; Straumann 1997; Moser 2003). The Swiss chemical 
industry abandoned mass production in order to focus on products with high value 
added, especially medicines. This specialization was linked very closely to a rise in 
research and development activities within companies. This strategy of innovation was 
backed by a policy of imitation. The absence of regulation concerning patents for the 
Swiss chemical industry allowed the Basle firms to concentrate its resources on 
imitating the procedures developed abroad (particularly in Germany and France). 
By excluding from patentability all invention in the chemical field, the patent law of 
1888 was thus able to conciliate the antagonist interests of Swiss industrialists. It was 
only in 1907 that a patent law worth its name came into being, even if a number of 
exclusions from patentability still existed. This new law was introduced for several 
reasons. Germany placed a great amount of political and economic pressure on its 
successful Swiss chemical competitor. The German chemical industry claimed that the 
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latter’s success was largely due to imitation – some spoke of ‘practices of robber 
barons’. The changing attitude of the large chemical firms was also responsible for the 
introduction of the 1907 patent law. Their development made them more and more 
dependent on innovations through their own activities of R&D and less on imitation, on 
learning by doing. In these conditions, a patent law became important for the Basle 
industry. In a few decades, the accusations of piracy were forgotten, and the Swiss 
chemical industry became known for the quality of its products (Tanner 1996). 
Conclusions 
The Swiss economy exhibited very good performance in terms of growth and economic 
development during most of the twentieth century. However, during the last two 
decades, especially during the 1990s, the average growth of the Swiss economy has 
been among the lowest of OECD countries. As argued above, political institutions were 
particularly decisive in the long-term growth of the Swiss economy between 1870 and 
1950 by providing social stability, legal security and efficient coordination for economic 
actors. These characteristics led to the adoption of economic institutions that were far 
removed from the liberal orthodoxy adopted by the IMF and the World Bank during the 
1980s and 1990s. The positive effects of these economic institutions have not 
profoundly changed during the last period, and political stability is still very high. 
However, since the beginning of the 1990s, several (neo-)liberal economists as well as 
business representatives, especially from the largest multinational companies, have been 
complaining about this weak growth and particularly pointed to the negative impact of 
political institutions (especially the facultative referendum, but also the federalism) on 
the growth of the Swiss economy (Borner et al. 1990). In a very ‘Olsonian’ perspective, 
these economists stress that the referendum is unilaterally favoring specialized interest 
groups opposed to change, the referendum being the privileged instrument of 
‘conservative’ forces of both the left and the right opposed to any political and 
economic reforms. It has thus become an obstacle for the ‘necessary’ economic and 
social reforms in a period of globalization and fierce international competition. 
Without going into an analysis of the recent slow growth period, which gave rise to a 
highly politicized debate,7 this changing interpretation of the impact of institutions is 
interesting. It first stresses that the role of institutions in one country can change over 
time, and, second, lessons from one country should not be considered as universal. If we 
want to understand the influence of institutions, we should take into account the specific 
social and economic context of each nations, in which institutions operate. 
Having mentioned this, we can nevertheless try to draw some lessons from the role of 
political and economic institutions for the Swiss growth between 1870 and 1950. First, 
by reinforcing political stability and by creating opportunities for cooperative problem-
                                                 
7  These institutions might have contributed in some ways to slow the growth of the last decades; in 
particular, by overemphasizing stability and incremental changes, political institutions tend to prevent 
innovation and new initiatives, which can be detrimental to growth. However, other factors, such as 
very restrictive macroeconomic policies (especially the monetary policy since the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system, which led to a steady appreciation of the Swiss franc and represented an 
handicap for exports) and more stringent credit policy of the banking sector, have also contributed to 
the stagnation of the 1990s. 
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solving mechanisms among major economic and political actors, political institutions 
provided positive structure to adopt economic institutions that were favourable for 
growth. 
Second, institutions of domestic compensation, besides their role in terms of political 
and social stability, also had an economic function. Domestic compensation and 
‘associative-dissociative’ development strategy adopted by Switzerland helped the 
country to abandon an export-led growth path (dominated by the major industrial 
exports) to a more ‘autocentric’ economic development at the end of the nineteenth 
century and the first half of the twentieth century. 
Third, the absence of economic institutions, such as patent law and central banking, 
generally considered as very important for economic growth by the IMF and the World 
Bank, was not detrimental to the rapid development of the Swiss economy during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. The Swiss historical experience showed that these 
‘good institutions’, seen today as necessary for economic development, did not play a 
central role in the first phase of the ‘Swiss success story’. However, they were replaced 
by other mechanisms that supported the economic development of the industrial and 
financial sectors. 
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